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The COVID-19 pandemic has raised complex moral dilemmas
that have been the subject of extensive public debate. Here, we
study how people judge a set of controversial actions related to
the crisis: relaxing data privacy standards to allow public control
of the pandemic, forbidding public gatherings, denouncing a
friend who violated COVID-19 protocols, prioritizing younger
over older patients when medical resources are scarce, and
reducing animal rights to accelerate vaccine development. We
collected acceptability judgements in an initial large-scale study
with participants from 10 Latin American countries (N= 15 420).
A formal analysis of the intrinsic correlations between responses
to different dilemmas revealed that judgements were organized
in two dimensions: one that reflects a focus on human life
expectancy and one that cares about the health of all sentient
lives in an equitable manner. These stereotyped patterns of
responses were stronger in people who endorsed utilitarian
decisions in a standardized scale. A second pre-registered study
performed in the USA (N = 1300) confirmed the replicability of
these findings. Finally, we show how the prioritization of public
health correlated with several contextual, personality and
demographic factors. Overall, this research sheds light on the
relationship between utilitarian decision-making and moral









































Over the last years, the psychological foundations of moral decision-making have been extensively
studied by looking at how people react to abstract dilemmas [1–7]. For example, in trolley-type
scenarios, participants are asked to decide whether it is acceptable to perform an action that will save
the lives of some people at the cost of killing others [1]. While remarkably informative, these
theoretical scenarios have several limitations. For example, people might be imprecise at estimating
their future emotional states [8–11] and, as a consequence, they may be inaccurate at forecasting how
they will judge and react when moral dilemmas are presented in the heat of the moment [12–15].
The COVID-19 pandemic has posed the world an extraordinarily difficult challenge that has brought
moral dilemmas to the public sphere. Issues such as how to assign scarce medical resources (e.g.
ventilators in cases of limited availability [16,17]), or whether it is acceptable to share sensitive private
data to effectively trace the virus [18], or the tension between ensuring physical distancing or allowing
economic and social activities [19], have shifted moral reasoning from theoretical to practical
considerations and became part of public deliberations all the way from lay people to policy makers.
This results in an unprecedented opportunity to understand how people make moral decisions,
which are relevant to policy making, in the midst of a healthcare crisis. Previous research has shown
that moral dilemmas can help provide a graded notion of values across peoples and cultures [20]. But,
above and beyond quantifying average preferences, here we aimed at performing a formal analysis of
the intrinsic correlations between different moral dilemmas. Summarizing, the main objective of this
work is to understand the organization of moral preferences in the emergence of real-life discussions
about the COVID-19 crisis and to unfold their relationship with moral responses in classic dilemmas.
We ground our work on the study of utilitarian decision-making [21]. Utilitarianism is a normative
theory that advocates that decisions ought to maximize a utility function reflecting the happiness and
well-being of all affected individuals. As an example, in trolley-like dilemmas where different
decisions lead to outcomes that vary in the number of deaths, the utilitarian prescription is to select
the option in which fewer people die. More recently, it has been argued that people making utilitarian
decisions in trolley-type dilemmas may in fact be relying on different considerations that produce the
same outcome [22]. According to this view, utilitarian preferences result from two very distinct
aspects: a ‘negative' dimension that reflects a permissive attitude towards instrumental harm, and a
‘positive' dimension, called impartial beneficence, which reflects an unbiased concern for the wellbeing
of all sentient lives. Previous research has shown that, while instrumental harm correlates with
psychopathic tendencies, impartial beneficence is associated with higher empathic concern [22].
Here, we empirically tested the idea that utilitarian decisions may be organized in two different
dimensions and asked whether and how they relate to moral judgements about the pandemic. To
address this aim, we designed five scenarios that probe different ways of responding to contemporary
dilemmas (figure 1a). The first three dilemmas pose a tension between public health and other values
of wellbeing: (1) effectively tracing the virus to control its spread versus protecting sensitive personal
data, (2) ensuring physical distancing by forbidding public gatherings and business operations versus
allowing those activities before a vaccine is developed, and (3) notifying a COVID-19 protocol breach
versus protecting a close friend from facing prison. The remaining two dilemmas ask whether one
should give priority to some lives above others in public health. The fourth dilemma is about the
assignment of ventilators in case of limited availability and asks whether all patients should be
treated equally or if younger individuals should be prioritized. This scenario could be thought of as a
real-life variant of a trolley dilemma where one has to choose between saving younger or older people
[20]. The fifth dilemma poses a tension between respecting the rights of animals in medical research
versus accelerating the development of a vaccine.
One way to characterize moral responses to these scenarios is by looking at majority or average
opinions. However, one may go one step further and study the pattern of correlations between
different judgements. For example, if a person thinks that younger patients should be prioritized in
their access to ventilators, will this person be more likely to support restrictions on social and
economic activity? To answer this question, and to identify how moral responses are organized across
these scenarios, here we examine the dimensionality of acceptability judgements (figure 1b,c).
This analysis requires a substantial amount of data, much more than is typically obtained in
classic psychological and cognitive experiments. To solve this, we capitalized on a program which we
have developed over the last years to perform cognitive experiments with large audiences [23–27].










































What is the underlying 
dimensionality of responses?
Figure 1. Moral problems about the COVID-19 pandemic and theoretical predictions. (a) We designed five moral scenarios that relate
to problems of the COVID-19 outbreak (see Methods for full descriptions of each scenario). The first three pose a tension between
prioritizing public health or other values and aspects of wellbeing. The last two ask if it is acceptable to prioritize younger human
lives at the cost of breaking elder and animal rights. (b) What is the underlying structure of moral responses to these scenarios? In
principle, if responses to all scenarios were highly correlated with each other, then they could be organized in one dimension.
However, according to bi-dimensional theories of utilitarian decision-making, moral responses should be better explained by
two components, each one correlating with a different dimension of utilitarianism (i.e. instrumental harm and impartial
beneficence). (c) Dilemmas were conceived to examine two distinct focuses on public health. The first is a concern about
maximizing human life expectancy whereby individuals prioritizing public health over other aspects of wellbeing also prioritize
younger human lives over older and animal lives (left panel). The second hypothesis is a focus on equitable public health








































10 Spanish-speaking Latin American countries (Study 1, N = 15420, 60.1% female, mean age: 32.0 y.o.,
range 18–95 years). We also tested the robustness of our findings in a second pre-registered study
with a representative sample of the USA (Study 2, N= 1300, 48.3% female, mean age: 41.2 y.o., range
18–89 years).
Participants read the five scenarios about the COVID-19 pandemic in randomized order as well as the
classic trolley problem in either its personal or impersonal version (see Methods for details). Each
scenario described a clear action and participants reported three quantities using sliders: their
perceived acceptability of that action (in a scale that ranged from ‘completely wrong' to ‘completely
right'), their confidence in that judgement (from ‘completely unsure' to ‘completely sure') and the
amount of distress that they think they would feel if they had to make a decision in that context
(from ‘none' to ‘a great deal').
To study the pattern of correlations between different dilemmas, we examine the underlying
dimensionality of the distribution of acceptability judgements. Responses to these dilemmas, which
varied widely across the population (electronic supplementary material, figure S1), define a native
five-dimensional space but, intuitively, if all points are scattered across a line, the underlying
dimensionality of the data is one, if they are scattered within a plane, the dimensionality is two, and
so on (figure 1b). While there are various techniques to formalize this intuition, one simple approach
to statistically test the underlying dimensionality of the data is to perform a principal component
analysis (PCA).
The advantage of this analysis, beyond its simplicity, is that it also provides the principal directions
across which people tend to be aligned, which may allow us to identify—to a first degree of
approximation—the argument of utility functions. Here, we consider and present two hypotheses about
the relationship between utilitarian decision-making and moral responses to the pandemic. The first
hypothesis is that people who make utilitarian judgements are focused on maximizing human life









































































Figure 2. Instrumental harm and impartial beneficence as different dimensions of utilitarian decision-making. Images display the
tendency to accept the utilitarian decision in the trolley problem, as a function of instrumental harm and impartial beneficence.
Colours code the mean acceptability rating averaged across participants at a given level of z-scored OUS-IB (x-axis) and OUS-IH








































also prioritize human over non-human animal life and younger over older patients (left panel of figure 1c).
The second hypothesis is that utilitarian decision-making should correlate with a focus on equitable public
health, i.e. people endorsing utilitarian principles in classic scenarios should prioritize public health in a
fair and impartial manner contemplating and respecting all lives. The prototypical response predicted by
this model is prioritizing public health in the first three dilemmas while respecting the rights of older
patients and non-human animals in the last two scenarios (left panel of figure 1c).2. Results
2.1. Individual differences in utilitarian decision-making
We measured individual differences in utilitarian decision-making [22] through a standardized scale (i.e.
the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, OUS, see Methods for details). This scale allows measuring individual
variations in overall utilitarianism as well as in each of two dimensions: instrumental harm (OUS-IH)
and impartial beneficence (OUS-IB). The study presenting this scale found a low degree of collinearity
between both dimensions of utilitarianism (i.e. r = 0.14, p < 0.01, see Table 6 in [22]). Here, we also
observed a low correlation between these two variables (r = 0.13, p < 10−64) justifying the use of both
dimensions as separate predictor variables (R2 = 0.01, VIF = 1.01).
We also replicated a key finding of the original study: individuals with high scores on any of the two
dimensions were more likely to support utilitarian decisions in the trolley dilemma (i.e. agree to sacrifice
the life of a person to save a greater number of individuals) both in the impersonal (figure 2a, correlation
with Instrumental Harm: r = 0.26, p < 10−128, correlation with impartial beneficence: r = 0.11, p < 10−21) as
well as in the personal (figure 2b, correlation with Instrumental Harm: r = 0.39, p < 10−281, correlation
with impartial beneficence: r = 0.10, p < 10−19) variants. Also consistent with that same previous study,
we found that the correlation of utilitarian judgements in trolley-type dilemmas with instrumental
harm was higher than the correlation with impartial beneficence (test for equal correlations, z = 10.39,
p < 10−200). Altogether, these results confirm that classic trolley dilemmas intermingle these two factors
that contribute to utilitarian decisions.
The bi-dimensional theory of utilitarian psychology presented in that same previous study [22] makes
two important predictions on other variables of the trolley problem which we collected in this large-scale
sample. The first one relates to confidence: if impartial beneficence and instrumental harm are separate
dimensions, then people's confidence should vary with the extremity of both two sub-scales. We
observed strong evidence consistent with this prediction (bi-variate regression of absolute z-scored OUS
sub-scales on confidence in the trolley problem, effect of instrumental harm: β = 0.22 ± 0.02, p < 10−28,






































This demonstrates that people scoring highly or lowly on instrumental harm or impartial beneficence
displayed higher confidence in their judgements.
The second prediction relates to the self-reported level of distress about making these decisions.
According to previous research, sub-clinical psychopathy has been shown to correlate positively with
instrumental harm and, instead, empathic concern correlates positively with impartial beneficence but
negatively with instrumental harm [22]. This predicts that self-reported distress will be greater for
those people with more impartial beneficence and lesser for those with more instrumental harm.
Observed values of self-reported distress about the trolley problem provided strong evidence
supporting the bi-dimensional nature of both sub-scales (bi-variate regression of z-scored sub-scales
on distress about the trolley problem, effect of instrumental harm: β =−0.15 ± 0.01, p < 10−41, effect of
impartial beneficence: β = 0.14 ± 0.01, p < 10−35, see electronic supplementary material, figure S2).l/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.8:2100962.2. Dimensionality analysis of moral problems of the pandemic
The overarching goal of this study is to understand the structure of moral responses to real-life dilemmas
that have emerged during the COVID-19 crisis. We organize and narrow this general and broad aim by
asking three questions that examine different fundamental fingerprints of the data: (1) What is the
underlying dimensionality of the space of moral responses?; (2) What are the relevant principal
components across which the data is organized?; and (3) How do these dimensions relate to
individual differences in utilitarian decision-making? To answer these questions, we analysed the
acceptability ratings that participants provided in response to the five moral scenarios about the
COVID-19 pandemic (figure 3a).
The first question can be naturally addressed by investigating the number of significant principal
components (i.e. the number of dimensions) that account for variance in the data above and beyond
what would be expected by pure chance (see Methods). This analysis unveiled two main components
explaining a significant proportion of the variance (figure 3b, random permutation test with 10 000
simulations, p < 10−5), which is a mathematical way of reflecting that the embedding of moral
responses is two-dimensional.
To address the second question, we looked at the directions of these two principal components, i.e.
which combinations of responses across dilemmas explain large fractions of the variance in the data
(electronic supplementary material, figure S3, information displayed in a PCA biplot [28] along with the
joint probability distribution of the two components). This analysis revealed that the first principal
component corresponds to a concern about human life expectancy (upper left panel of figure 3b), namely,
a pattern of stereotyped responses where people prioritizing public health in the first three dilemmas
also prioritize younger over older patients and human over non-human life. The second component is
consistent with a focus on equitable public health (upper right panel of figure 3b) whereby prioritizing
public health in the first three dilemmas is associated with the tendency to respect ethical procedures of
animal research and the rights of elderly patients. These two principal components were still identifiable
if we narrowed our analyses to four instead of five dilemmas (electronic supplementary material, figure
S4). This robustness check suggests that the results presented so far are not driven by the observations
made in any single dilemma but reflect a strong interplay of correlations across scenarios.
The third question asks whether these patterns of correlations match with the participants' tolerance
to instrumental harm and their concern for impartial beneficence, as measured by the Oxford
Utilitarianism Scale. To address this, we performed a regression of both components with the two
sub-scales as predictor variables (figure 3c,d). We found that the first principal component (figure 3c;
electronic supplementary material, figure S5) was significantly modulated by instrumental harm
(β = 0.31 ± 0.04, p < 10−12) but not by impartial beneficence (β = 0.02 ± 0.03, p = 0.64). Conversely, the
second principal component (figure 3d; electronic supplementary material, figure S5) was explained
by individual variations in impartial beneficence (β = 0.24 ± 0.03, p < 10−12) but not in instrumental
harm (β =−0.05 ± 0.04, p = 0.23). These two findings are consistent with the prediction that people who
make utilitarian judgements may react differently to dilemmas which set priorities to some or all
lives. Individuals with high scores of impartial beneficence will generally prefer not to assign
priorities on ventilator use and will not agree on lowering the threshold of animal rights to
accelerating the development of a vaccine, while the opposite choices will be preferred by those
scoring highly on instrumental harm. Our results also reveal that both utilitarian dimensions agree on
prioritizing public health over other non-health related aspects of wellbeing such as data privacy,





























































































































































































(Latin America, N = 15, 420)
study 1







































Figure 3. Dimensionality analysis of moral problems of the pandemic and relationship with utilitarian decision-making. (a) We performed a
principal component analysis (PCA) of the acceptability ratings provided by participants in response to five moral dilemmas about the COVID-19
crisis. The arrows indicate how we coded the loadings of the principal components. For example, a positive loading in red reflects more
agreement with public officials using private data to effectively trace the virus. (b) In Study 1 (performed in Latin America with 15420
participants), we observed that the first two principal components explained a significant amount of variance in the data. Black squares
show the percentage of variance explained by each of the five principal components, and insets display the loadings of each variable,
with each colour coding a different dilemma as in (a). The first principal component is consistent with a concern about human life
expectancy and the second component with a focus on equitable public health. The light grey shade shows the ranges of variance
percentages explained by 10 000 random permutations of the data. (c) Relationship between different dimensions of utilitarian decision-
making and the first principal component (i.e. human life expectancy). Images show the average score of each component for
participants with a given value of z-scored impartial beneficence (OUS-IB, x-axis) and instrumental harm (OUS-IH, y-axis). These data
suggest that the principal components reflecting human life expectancy show greater correlation with instrumental harm than with
impartial beneficence. (d ) Same as (c) but for the second principal component. The data suggests that the principal components
reflecting equitable public health show greater correlation with impartial beneficence than with instrumental harm. (e,f ) Same as (b–d)















































































2.3. Pre-registered replication study in the USA
One potential concern with Study 1 is that we could not control the representativeness of the sample that
we obtained. For this reason, we performed a second pre-registered study in a different setting (Study 2),
using a sample that is representative of the US population in terms of age, gender and ethnicity
(electronic supplementary material, table S1). To determine sample size, we performed a Monte Carlo
power analysis based on the data collected in Study 1 (electronic supplementary material, figure S6).
Based on this analysis, we recruited 1300 participants, yielding an estimated power of 83.8%.
A second fundamentalmotivation for conducting this study is that it allowedus to test the robustness and
replicability of our findings. With this aim, we pre-registered the hypotheses and methods of this study,
specifying that its aim was to replicate the three main findings observed in Study 1 (https://aspredicted.
org/59kk7.pdf). First, we predicted the existence of two principal components explaining a significant
proportion of the variance in the data (figure 3b). Second, we hypothesized that these two dimensions
would reflect a concern for human life expectancy (figure 1c, i.e. a principal component with positive
loadings for all five scenarios) and an interest in equitable public health (figure 1c, i.e. a principal
component with positive loadings for the first three scenarios and negative loadings for the last two).
Third, we predicted a positive correlation between instrumental harm and human life expectancy and a
positive correlation between impartial beneficence and equitable public health (figure 3c,d).
We first focused on the prediction that only two dimensions would explain a significant proportion of
the variance in the data. To formally test this, we performed a random permutation analysis. As per our
pre-registration, we generated 10 000 surrogated datasets by randomly shuffling the participants' labels
for each scenario. Applying PCA on each surrogate, we estimated the distribution of explained variances
for each component under the null hypothesis that there are no correlations in the data. As in Study 1, we
observed that only the first two principal components explained more variance in the data than what is
expected by chance (figure 3e, random permutation test, p < 10−5).
Our second prediction was that these two dimensions would reflect human life expectancy and
equitable public health. We tested this hypothesis by examining the signs of the five loadings for the
first two principal components. As predicted, we found that one of those two dimensions had
positive loadings for all dilemmas (upper left panel of figure 3e, a dimension consistent with a
concern for human life expectancy) and the other component had positive loadings for the first three
dilemmas and negative loadings for the last two (upper right panel of figure 3e, a dimension which
reflects an interest in equitable public health).
The only difference between these findings and the ones observed in Study 1 is that the order of the
two principal components was reversed (i.e. equitable public health explained more variance than
human life expectancy). However, it is important to remark that we explicitly did not make any pre-
registered claim about which of the two dimensions would be more representative in the data. This is
because we reasoned that the different contexts associated with both studies may switch on how
people give priority to these dimensions. Instead, the prediction of our study was that, while this may
vary, variance in the data would still be structured in these two underlying dimensions. This effect,
which was first observed in Study 1 (figure 3b), was successfully replicated in Study 2 (figure 3e).
Our third and last prediction was that each of these two components should correlate with a different
aspect of utilitarian decision-making. As predicted, we observed that the component reflecting a concern
for human life expectancy was positively correlated with having a permissive attitude towards
instrumental harm (figure 3f, r = 0.20, p < 10−13). We also found a significant correlation between the
component suggesting an interest in equitable public health and impartial beneficence (figure 3g, r = 0.39,
p < 10−49). Importantly, these correlations were positive and significantly higher than the opposite and
corresponding associations, i.e. if we correlated human life expectancy with impartial beneficence (test for
equal correlations, z = 5.5, p < 10−6) or equitable public health with instrumental harm (z = 4.8, p < 10−6).
Overall, these findings indicate that Study 2 successfully replicated the results obtained in Study 1
despite using a different sampling strategy and collecting data in a different language, country and
moment of the pandemic. These results provide strong evidence that moral judgements in response to
these five dilemmas are organized in two dimensions, which are well predicted by people's scores in
impartial beneficence and instrumental harm.
2.4. Contextual and personality factors
Our next question was whether, above and beyond these effects, any residual variance in the data could be
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Figure 4. Country-level effects on moral preferences. (a) In Study 1, we collected data from 10 countries where the impact of the
pandemic has been highly dissimilar at the time when the study was performed (May 2020). The map displays the countries from
where we have obtained data. Colours show the per capita total number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths by the end of data collection.
Country labels are Uruguay (URU), Argentina (ARG), Colombia (COL), Honduras (HOR), Bolivia (BOL), Chile (CHI), Mexico (MEX),
Panama (PAN), Peru (PER) and Ecuador (ECU). (b) Projection onto the first two principal components (PCs) for participants
proceeding from different countries. Participants were grouped based on the number of COVID-19 deaths per million people at
the country from where they proceed. Less than 10: URU. Between 10 and 50: ARG, BOL, COL and HON. Between 50 and 100:
CHI and MEX. More than 100: PER and ECU. Bars denote average PC score across participants, and vertical lines depict SEM.
(c) We performed a multivariate regression analysis on the scores obtained for each PC. Circles show coefficient estimates for the
first PC (Human Life Expectancy) and squares show coefficient estimates for the second PC (Equitable Public Health). Predictor
variables displayed are Instrumental Harm (IH), Impartial Beneficence (IB) and the country-level pandemic's severity, quantified as
the COVID-19 deaths per million people. Vertical lines show SEM and colours code the t-value associated with each coefficient. For








































constant values of utilitarian scores. This effort can be seen as a way of putting together different aspects of
an individual—their tendency to make utilitarian decisions, their personality traits, and contextual
elements—to disentangle how they differentially affect moral responses to the pandemic. To this end,
we focused on the large-scale dataset obtained in Study 1 and ran a multivariate regression on the
projection of each principal component as a function of 15 moral, contextual, personality and
demographic variables (see Methods, electronic supplementary material, table S2 and table S3).
Previous research has suggested that negative contexts trigger affective states that could modify moral
preferences [12], and so we reasoned that, even at constant values of utilitarianism, individuals proceeding
from countries where the COVID-19 crisis is currently more severe could display greater preference to
prioritize public health in moral dilemmas. To test this hypothesis, we analysed the data collected in
Study 1 with participants proceeding from 10 Latin American countries (figure 4a). Importantly, by the
time the study was performed (May 2020), the impact of the pandemic had shown a thirty-fold
difference in confirmed COVID-19 deaths per million people (i.e. 6 for Uruguay and over 180 for Ecuador).
We observed that the intensity of the crisis, quantified by the per capita number of COVID-19 deaths,
significantly modulated the participants' projection onto the first (β = 0.05 ± 0.01, p < 10−4) and second
(β = 0.07 ± 0.01, p < 10−8) principal components (figure 4b,c). This association remained significant if,
instead of using the per capita number of deaths, we used the per capita number of confirmed








































the second principal component). Overall, this analysis suggests that variations in the severity of the
context modulated the projection onto both principal components.
However, the correlation of COVID-19 deaths (or any other variable, of course) with a principal
component does not imply directly a correlation with responses to individual dilemmas. Just to give a
simple example: if 4 of the 5 dilemmas would correlate positively with COVID-19 deaths then a
principal component with all positive loadings (like the first principal component in Study 1) may
also show a significant correlation although one of the dilemmas that defined this component did not
correlate with COVID-19 deaths. Therefore, to understand the relationship between the severity of the
pandemic and people's responses to individual dilemmas, we performed a post hoc correlation
analysis. We found that the correlation between the number of COVID-19 deaths and the acceptability
ratings to the first three scenarios was significantly positive (Scenario 1: r = 0.03, p = 0.001; Scenario 2:
r = 0.03, p = 0.001; Scenario 3: r = 0.04, p = 7 × 10−7) while we observed a non-significant correlation
with the responses to the last two scenarios (Scenario 4: r = 0.01, p = 0.14; Scenario 5: r = 0.003,
p = 0.63). This finding suggests that the observed modulation given by the severity of the pandemic on
the two principal components is driven by the first three scenarios, which have positive loadings for
both components. In other words, the association between the severity of the pandemic and the two
principal components is a result of a stronger prioritization of public health over other aspects of
wellbeing and is unrelated to the trade-off between younger and older patients (Scenario 4) or
between human and animal rights (Scenario 5).
To further examine the potential role played by contextual factors, we asked participants to report
their personal proximity to the pandemic by indicating whether they were diagnosed with COVID-19
and/or if they knew someone who did. In our sample, 0.6% (n = 92) reported to have tested positive
for COVID-19, 31.5% (n = 4949 participants) reported to have at least one acquaintance who tested
positive, and 67.9% (n = 10 685 participants) reported not knowing anyone diagnosed with the virus.
We found no evidence that being diagnosed with COVID-19 (first principal component: β =−0.06 ±
0.05, p = 0.24, second principal component: β =−0.01 ± 0.05, p = 0.73), having COVID-like symptoms
(first principal component: β = 0.01 ± 0.01, p = 0.39, second principal component: β = 0.004 ± 0.009,
p = 0.66), or being close to patients who tested positive (first principal component: β =−0.54 ± 0.40,
p = 0.17, second principal component: β = 0.09 ± 0.40, p = 0.81) modulated the projection to any of the
two principal components. This indicates that the observed country-level differences are probably
driven by concerns about the societal impact of the pandemic rather than the personal proximity to
the virus.
We also reasoned that differences in general personality traits could also be associated with
variability on how individuals make moral judgements. We asked participants to complete the Big
Five Inventory [31] (see Methods) and investigated whether variations across these five dimensions of
personality could explain residual variance in the data after controlling for the already described
contextual and moral effects. We found that both principal components correlated positively with
conscientiousness (first PC: β = 0.03 ± 0.01, p = 0.002; second PC: β = 0.03 ± 0.01, p = 0.01) and
neuroticism (first PC: β = 0.04 ± 0.01, p = 0.003; second PC: β = 0.05 ± 0.01, p < 10−4). This suggests that
the tendency to prioritize public health over other aspects of wellbeing (either by focusing on human
life expectancy or equitable public health) is especially strong in individuals who are diligent and
responsible, but also susceptible to experience negative emotions that are prevalent during the
pandemic like anxiety [32] and fear [33]. We also found that agreeableness was not associated with
any of the two components, a result which might be explained by the fact that this trait strongly
correlates with instrumental harm (negative correlation, r =−0.09, p < 10−10) and impartial beneficence
(positive correlation, r = 0.10, p < 10−13). We again emphasize that these results reflect personality
modulations on moral predispositions above and beyond the effects given by individual differences
utilitarian scores.
Two personality traits, extraversion and openness, showed different effects on the two principal
components, which differ on whether it is acceptable to prioritize younger people over older and
animal lives (figure 1c). More extraversion was associated with higher scores in the first principal
component and lower scores in the second (first PC: β = 0.05 ± 0.01, p < 10−4; second PC: β =−0.06 ±
0.01, p < 10−6). This is in line with previous observations that high extraversion is associated with
psychopathic tendencies [34] and the propensity to break rules [35]. Openness showed a strong
negative correlation with the first, but not the second, principal component (first PC: β =−0.08 ± 0.01,
p < 10−13; second PC: β =−0.02 ± 0.01, p = 0.05) which is consistent with research showing that scoring
lowly on this trait is associated with the endorsement of different forms of prejudice, including









































The analyses presented in this study suggest that inter-individual differences in utilitarian decision-
making predict judgements about moral problems of the COVID-19 crisis. These effects are robust to
the inclusion of a long list of control variables (see electronic supplementary material, tables S2 and
S3 for details) that index individual differences in contextual, personality and demographic factors.
Moreover, the bi-dimensional organization of moral responses to the pandemic and their correlation
with instrumental harm and impartial beneficence is consistent with a recently proposed theory of
utilitarian decision-making [22].
While this paper focuses on the relationship between responses to moral problems of the COVID-19
crisis and utilitarian judgements, this does not mean that other theorized processes (for example,
deontological mechanisms based on emotion or motivation to avoid harm [38,39]) do not exist or
influence judgements above and beyond the observed effects [40,41]. Future research should explore how
the endorsement of deontological considerations relate to moral responses about this healthcare crisis [42,43].
This research aimed at studying inter-individual differences in moral decision-making during the
pandemic. We show that people who support utilitarian decisions in the trolley dilemma [1] and in
the scenarios constituting the OUS [22] concurrently make a series of acceptability judgements in
moral scenarios about the COVID-19 crisis. However, lay people arrive at judgements through a
multiplicity of processes which may or may not coincide with the utilitarian principles proposed by
theorists. Therefore, seeing that instrumental harm or impartial beneficence correlates with the two
principal components observed in this study does not necessarily imply that participants always rely
on those arguments across all scenarios or that the OUS scale will explain moral decisions in a wider
set of dilemmas about the COVID-19 crisis [42]. Nonetheless, the observed correlation between those
scores and judgements in the five tested scenarios is a robust phenomenon that is not explained by
responses to any single dilemma (electronic supplementary material, figure S4) nor by the sampling
strategy used in the initial study (figure 3f,g).
In Study 1, we generated a large-scale dataset of moral preferences in Latin America, a region that
was seriously impacted by the pandemic, and that had contributed to more than 30% of the COVID-
19 confirmed deaths by the time the study was performed. Our findings suggest that the crisis may
have shifted the focus of utilitarian judgement (generally concerned about several dimensions of
wellbeing) to setting a clear priority on public health, given that participants from countries where the
pandemic had a more severe impact had a higher projection onto the two principal components.
While the evidence presented here is correlational, this study represents a first step towards
understanding country-level differences in policy preferences while controlling for individual-level
variations in moral and personality variables, among others.
In Study 2, we showed that the utilitarian prioritization of public health over other aspects of
wellbeing is a robust empirical observation. This is despite the replication study using a different
sampling strategy and being performed in a different country, language and moment of the pandemic.
While these data show that our main results are replicable in a very different setting, further research
is needed to assert whether the utilitarian focus on public health is currently present in cross-cultural
samples including other regions of the World [44,45]. In this sense, we believe that the methodology
described here can be scaled up to performing large-scale online behavioural studies based on big
data obtained from social media [46,47].
In conclusion, this research organized people's judgements about contemporary problems of the
pandemic according to well-established utilitarian principles such as people's tolerance to instrumental
harm and their concern for impartial beneficence. This classification should be an important input for
policymakers aiming at constructing policies that represent their citizens' preferences. On top of that,
we believe that understanding people's moral judgements about these issues can help political leaders
to design more persuasive messages and improve the communication of public policies to address the
crisis [48,49].4. Methods
4.1. Context
Study 1 was part of an initiative called TEDxperiments aimed at constructing knowledge on human








































tedxperiments). Previous editions studied the use of a competition bias in a ‘zero-sum fallacy’ game [23],
the role of deliberation in the wisdom of crowds [26], and the factors underlying consensus in polarized
moral debates [27]. The study was in collaboration with El Gato y la Caja, a science popularization project
that has previously performed large-scale behavioural studies on different aspects of human psychology
[24,25]. On this occasion, the invitation to participate in the study was distributed online through the
social media accounts of TEDxperiments and El Gato y la Caja. Participants signed a written informed
consent, and were provided with contact details of the lead researcher. They were explicitly informed
that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. The
procedure was approved by the ethics committee of CEMIC (Centro de Educación Médica e
Investigaciones Clínicas Norberto Quirno) – Protocol 435, v. 5.
4.2. Participants
The invitation to perform Study 1 was first published on 6th May 2020 and we collected data until 31st
May 2020. During this time window, we recruited N = 15 420 participants (60.1% female, mean age:
32.0 y.o., range (18–95) years), most of them proceeding from Argentina (n = 14 443). The remaining
977 participants were from Mexico (n = 214), Uruguay (n = 204), Peru (n = 119), Ecuador (n = 107),
Bolivia (n = 106), Colombia (n = 99), Chile (n = 92), Honduras (n = 37) and Panama (n = 32).
4.3. Procedure
Participants read five scenarios related to the COVID-19 crisis in randomized order, as well as the trolley
problem in either its personal or impersonal version. Half of the participants were presented with the
trolley problem before reading the five scenarios about the pandemic, and the other half after. Each
scenario described a clear action and we asked participants to report the acceptability of that action
(in a scale from ‘completely wrong' to ‘completely right') and their confidence about the provided
answer (from ‘I feel completely unsure' to ‘I feel completely sure'). We also asked them to imagine
that they were the person responsible for deciding what to do in that situation and report the amount
of distress that they think they would feel (from ‘none' to ‘a great deal'). In all cases, participants
input their answers by moving three sliders on the screen, providing us with a value that ranged from
0 to 100. After reading the five scenarios about the pandemic and the trolley problem, participants
completed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. Then, they were asked to report their age, gender, and
whether had been diagnosed with COVID-19 and/or knew someone who had. Finally, they were
invited to complete a standard personality test (see below for details).
4.4. Scenarios
The first scenario askswhether it is acceptable to allow the government to collect sensitive private data to allow
tracking the virus. It reads: ‘Supposewe can go back in time before the pandemic had explodedworldwide. A
new technology allows governments to automatically collect personal information about our movements and
the people we have physical contact with. Governments can also have access to biometric data such as our
temperature and respiratory frequency. This allows identifying people at risk of having COVID-19 and
limiting the propagation of the virus by selecting who is quarantined and who is not. The government of
the country where you live evaluates a plan to use this technology but understands that it does not protect
the personal data of its citizens and decides not to approve it. Not approving this plan is…'.
The second scenario is about forbidding public gatherings, including several business activities, until
a vaccine is found. It reads: ‘The near future of our societies and how we will get out of the periods of
strict confinement is unclear, among other things because there are great unknowns in the mutation rates
of the virus, its seasonal variance, the probability of being re-infected, and the degree of immunity that
we will reach. Societies are likely to create a compromise between minimizing health risks and preserving
our desired lifestyles. Knowing this, a government decides to forbid all kinds of public gatherings
(including restaurants, bars, concerts, cinemas and theatres) until a vaccine is found. The
government's decision is…'. As a clarification, we stress that this scenario assumes that the
development of a vaccine is equivalent to the end of the COVID-19 crisis. However, to date, there is
no evidence on whether vaccines will be sufficiently effective to overcome the life-destroying effects of
social activities. The aim of this scenario is to ask participants whether in the present situation (no
vaccine) it is correct to forbid all public gatherings or not. This has been part of a very active public








































The third scenario deals with the tension between notifying a COVID-19 protocol breach versus
protecting a close friend from facing prison. It reads: ‘One of your close friends has high fever and
was recently tested for COVID-19. The health authorities of your country have dictated that he should
remain at home, in complete isolation, until the results are back. During this period, your friend went
once to the supermarket to buy food. If the authorities find out about this, your friend might face
prison and have a criminal record. You still do not know whether he will test positive for COVID-19
but decided to call the police and tell the authorities about this situation. Telling the authorities about
this situation is…'.
The fourth scenario is about the assignment of scarce medical resources and asks whether younger
people should be prioritized over older patients. It reads: ‘Ventilators have become in many countries
a limited resource and a medical bottleneck. An ethics committee is deciding how to set priorities on
who will be treated and who will not. One option is to treat people on a first-come first-serve basis. A
second argument is made that significantly younger patients (under 30 years old) should be
prioritized and that, even when chances of recovery are considered to be the same, the younger
patient should be treated before older patients. The ethics committee opts to implement the second
option. This decision is…'
The fifth scenario poses a tension between animal rights and accelerating the development of a
vaccine for COVID-19. It reads: ‘A laboratory has all the necessary resources to develop a vaccine
against coronavirus in only weeks. However, to do so, the researchers need to violate ethical
guidelines for the use of animals in scientific research. Particularly, the experiments will cause
excessive stress and pain to hundreds of rodents. The laboratory requests an exceptional permission
to perform these experiments, but the government decides to reject this request. Rejecting this
permission is…'
For the purposes of data analysis, we reverse-coded the acceptability ratings to the first and fifth
dilemma, so that positive values indicate a prioritization to public health and a prioritization to
saving younger human lives (figure 1a).4.5. Trolley problems
The impersonal version of the trolley problem was presented as follows: ‘A runaway train is speeding
down the tracks towards five people who will be killed if the train continues on its present course.
You are standing next to the tracks, but you are too far away to warn them. Next to you, there is a
control switch that can redirect the train onto a different track, where there is only one person. If you
decide to flip the control switch, that will provoke the death of one person, but the train will not
continue its course and you will have saved the lives of five people. Flipping the control switch is …'.
The personal variant of the same classic scenario read: ‘A runaway train is speeding down the tracks
towards five people who will be killed if the train continues on its present course. You are standing next
to the tracks, but you are too far away to warn them. Next to you, there is someone else and, if this person
falls to the tracks, the train will derail. If you decide to push this person onto the tracks, that will provoke
the death of this person, but the train will not continue its course and you will have saved the lives of five
people. Pushing the person onto the tracks is…'4.6. Utilitarianism scale
Individual differences in utilitarian tendencies were measured using the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale
(OUS), which was developed and validated in a previous study [22]. The scale consists of nine items
presented in randomized order, four of which measure permissive attitudes towards instrumental
harm (OUS-IH, instrumental harm) and the remaining five evaluate people's impartial concern for the
greater good (OUS-IB, impartial beneficence). All nine items were read on the same page and
responses were collected using a 7-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree'.
The four items of the OUS-IH sub-scale are: 1) ‘It is morally right to harm an innocent person if
harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people'; 2) ‘If the only way to
ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use of political oppression
for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used'; 3) ‘It is permissible to torture an
innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information to prevent a bomb going off that
would kill hundreds of people'; 4) ‘Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as






































The five items of the OUS-IB sub-scale are: 1) ‘If the only way to save another person's life during an
emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice'; 2) ‘From a
moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney failure
since we don't need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy'; 3) ‘From a moral
perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the planet equally; they
should not favour the well-being of people who are especially close to them either physically or
emotionally'; 4) ‘It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself';
and 5) ‘It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn't really need if one can donate it to causes
that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal'./journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.8:2100964.7. Principal component analysis
We performed a PCA on the acceptability ratings across the five scenarios related to the COVID-19
pandemic. To identify the number of principal components that explained a significantly large
proportion of the variance, we performed a random permutation analysis. We generated 10 000
surrogated datasets by randomly shuffling the participants' labels for each scenario. Applying PCA on
each surrogate, we estimated the distribution of explained variances for the first to fifth component
under the null hypothesis that there are no correlations in the data (grey shade in figure 3a). We then
estimated the p-value of this statistical test as the fraction of times that a given component in the
simulated data accounted for more variance than the one observed explained by that same
component in the real data. We found that the first and second principal components explained more
variance than any of the first and second components in the surrogated dataset, whereas the
remaining three components explained less variance than was expected by pure chance.4.8. Pre-registered replication study
Study 2 aimed at providing a high-powered pre-registered replication of Study 1 while using a sample
which is representative of the United States population. To determine sample size, we performed a
Monte Carlo power analysis based on the data collected in the original study. For each simulated
sample size, we randomly sub-sampled the dataset 10 000 times without replacement and repeated
the analyses performed in Study 1. We then estimated power as the fraction of times that we were
able to successfully replicate three observations: (i) the existence of two principal components
explaining a significant proportion of the variance in the data; (ii) the fact that these two dimensions
would reflect human life expectancy and equitable public health (figure 1c); and (iii) the association
between each principal component with instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Based on the
results of this power analysis (electronic supplementary material, figure S3), we decided to collect data
from 1300 participants.
On 23rd October 2020, we pre-registered the hypotheses, design and analysis plan of Study 2
(https://aspredicted.org/59kk7.pdf). Data collection started on 23 October 2020 and proceeded until
30 October 2020. In this time window, we recruited the target sample size (aged 18–89, 48.3% female).
This sample was obtained through Prolific, an online platform to recruit human participants for
scientific research (https://www.prolific.co/). To obtain this sample, participants were stratified across
three demographics: age, sex and ethnicity. Recruited participants were divided into subgroups that
have similar proportions to the national population, based on data obtained from the US Census
Bureau (https://www.census.gov/). The demographic characteristics of our sample and their
comparison with the US population are available in electronic supplementary material, table S1.4.9. Country-level COVID-19 data
Data about COVID-19 confirmed deaths and cases were obtained through a free and open-access
platform called ‘Our World in Data' that publishes research and data on some of the world's largest
problems including health, poverty and human rights, among many others (https://ourworldindata.
org/). Data about coronavirus published on that platform rely on figures issued by official authorities
such as governments and ministries of health. The map displayed in figure 4a was first obtained








































4.10. Other individual-level contextual factors
In principle, one may reasonably ask whether showing COVID-like symptoms is a better predictor of
moral responses than being diagnosed with COVID-19. This question is relevant given that a large
fraction of carriers of COVID-19 are known to be asymptomatic. However, in our sample, the
proportion of diagnosed individuals who were entirely asymptomatic is expected be very low, given
that the criterion to get tested for COVID-19 in most Latin American countries is showing COVID-like
symptoms. In Study 1, we asked participants to indicate whether they had fever. If they were
diagnosed with COVID-19, we asked if that symptom showed up at some point during the course of
the disease. If they had not been diagnosed with COVID-19, we asked if they had fever in the
previous week. We observed that 94.7% of the participants who were diagnosed with COVID-19 also
indicated to have had fever during the course of the disease. We also observed that 1.7% of our
sample indicated having fever but not being diagnosed with COVID-19. To study whether symptoms
could predict moral responses we added this binary variable as a predictor in the regression estimated
in electronic supplementary material, tables S2 and S3. However, we found that it did not modulate
any of the two first principal components (first principal component: β = 0.01 ± 0.01, p = 0.39; second
principal component: β = 0.004 ± 0.009, p = 0.66). This finding is consistent with our previous
observation that individual-level contextual variables did not modulate responses to the moral
scenarios (electronic supplementary material, tables S2 and S3).
4.11. Individual and contextual effects on self-reported distress about COVID-19 problems
We observed that individuals scoring high on instrumental harm reported less distress about the trolley
dilemma and the opposite effect was found for people with high scores on impartial beneficence
(electronic supplementary material, figure S2). One question that arises from these findings is whether
this effect holds for COVID-19 problems. To answer this question, we looked at the correlation
between each sub-score of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale and the average rating of self-reported
distress across the five moral dilemmas about the pandemic. In accordance with our observations
based on the Trolley Problem (electronic supplementary material, figure S2), we found that distress
negatively correlated with instrumental harm (r =−0.07, p = 4 × 10−16) and positively correlated with
impartial beneficence (r =−0.15, p = 3 × 10−73). We also asked whether contextual variables modulated
self-reported measures of distress and found that the only significant predictor of less distress when
considering moral problems of the pandemic was being diagnosed with COVID-19 (β =−0.47 ± 0.23,
p = 0.03).
4.12. Big five personality traits
In Study 1, we assessed personality using the 44-item Big Five Inventory [31], measuring participants on
five dimensions of personality (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness).
Each item is presented in a 5-choice answer format that ranges from complete disagreement (1 = very
false for me) to complete agreement (5 = very true for me). We used a version in Rioplatense Spanish,
adapted and validated in previous research [50].
4.13. Multivariate regression
To measure how the projection onto the first two principal components depended on moral, contextual,
personality and demographic variables, we performed a multivariate linear regression. This regression
included a total of 15 predictor variables, as displayed in electronic supplementary material, tables S2
and S3. Within those 15 regressors, we included two binary variables related to the structure of the
study (i.e. ‘experimental' variables): the order of presentation of the trolley problem (0: before the five
main scenarios, 1: after reading the five main scenarios) and its version (0: impersonal, 1: personal).
Data accessibility. All data and codes to reproduce our findings [51] are available at https://osf.io/mwe9r/
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